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ABSTRACT
A trust network is a social network in which edges represent
the trust relationship between two nodes in the network. In
a trust network, a fundamental question is how to assess
and compute the bias and prestige of the nodes, where the
bias of a node measures the trustworthiness of a node and
the prestige of a node measures the importance of the node.
The larger bias of a node implies the lower trustworthiness
of the node, and the larger prestige of a node implies the
higher importance of the node. In this paper, we define a
vector-valued contractive function to characterize the bias
vector which results in a rich family of bias measurements,
and we propose a framework of algorithms for computing the
bias and prestige of nodes in trust networks. Based on our
framework, we develop four algorithms that can calculate
the bias and prestige of nodes effectively and robustly. The
time and space complexities of all our algorithms are linear
w.r.t. the size of the graph, thus our algorithms are scalable
to handle large datasets. We evaluate our algorithms using
five real datasets. The experimental results demonstrate the
effectiveness, robustness, and scalability of our algorithms.
1. INTRODUCTION
Online social networks (OSNs) such as Facebook, Twitter,
and MySpace have become increasingly popular in recent
years. These OSNs provide users with various utilities to
share all sorts of information with friends, such as thoughts,
activities, photos, etc. As a new way to express informa-
tion, trust networks such as Advogato (www.advogato.org),
Kaitiaki (www.kaitiaki.org.nz), Epinions (www.epinions.
com), and Slashdot (www.slashdot.org) rapidly attract more
and more attention. Unlike the traditional OSNs where
edges represent the friendship between users, in the trust
networks, edges express the trust relationship between two
users. In other words, users express their trust to other users
by giving a trust score to another, and users are evaluated
by others based on their trust scores. There exist two types
of trust networks, namely, unsigned and signed. In the un-
signed trust networks, such as Advogato and Kaitiaki, users
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can only express their trust to other users by giving a non-
negative trust score to others. In the signed trust networks,
such as Epinions and Slashdot, users can express their trust
or distrust to others by giving a positive or negative trust
score to others. There are many applications in the trust
networks, such as finding the trusted nodes in a network
[23], predicting the trust score of the nodes, and the trust
based recommendation systems [21].
In a signed/unsigned trust network, the final trustworthi-
ness of a user is determined by how users trust each other
in a global context, and is measured by bias. The bias of a
user reflects the extent up to which his/her opinions differ
from others. If a user has a zero bias, then his/her opin-
ions are 100% unbiased and can be 100% taken. Conse-
quently, the user has high trustworthiness. On the other
hand, if a user has a large bias, then his/her opinions cannot
be 100% taken because his/her opinions are often different
from others. Therefore, the user has low trustworthiness.
Another important measure, the prestige of a user, reflects
how he/she is trusted by others (the importance). In this
work, we study how to assess and compute the bias and
prestige of the users. The challenges are: (1) how to de-
fine a reasonable bias measurement that can capture the
bias of the users’ opinions, (2) how to handle the negative
trust scores in signed trust networks, and (3) how to de-
sign a robust algorithm that can prevent attack from some
adversarial users.
As pointed out in [23], the traditional eigenvector based
methods, such as eigenvector centrality [4], HITS [5], and
PageRank [17], cannot be directly used to solve this prob-
lem. The reason is of twofold. First, the eigenvector based
methods typically cannot handle the negative edges. More-
over, they cannot distinguish the two cases, namely non-
connection and zero trust score, where a zero trust score
implies that there is an edge from a user to another user
with the zero trust score (e.g., W32 in Fig. 1). Second, they
ignore the bias of the nodes. To the best of our knowledge,
the algorithm proposed by Mishra and Bhattacharya [23]
is the only algorithm that addresses this problem. We re-
fer to this algorithm as the MB algorithm (or simply MB).
MB is tailored for the signed trust networks, and can also
be used for the unsigned trust networks. However, MB has
major drawbacks. The trustworthiness of a user cannot be
trusted due to the fact that MB treats bias of a user by
relative differences between itself and others. For instance,
if a user gives all his/her friends a much higher trust score
than the average of others, and gives all his/her foes a much
lower trust score than the average of others, such differences
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cancel out, which leads to a zero bias for the user. This
cancellation happens in either a signed or a unsigned trust
network. Therefore, MB can be attacked by the adversarial
users. We will analyze it in Section 3 in detail.
In this paper, we propose new bias measurements to cap-
ture the bias of the users’ opinions. First, we define a vector-
valued contractive function as a framework to represent the
bias vector, which implies a rich family of bias measure-
ments and thereby results in a rich family of algorithms.
On the basis of our framework, we develop four new bias
measurements using absoluate differences instead of relative
differences to deal with bias, in order to avoid such a can-
cellation problem in MB. Based on the bias of the nodes,
the trustworthiness score of a node is inversely proportional
to the bias score of the node, and the prestige of a node is
the average trustworthiness-weighted trust scores. In other
words, if a node is with a large bias score, then the trust
scores given by this node will be assigned to small weights.
Our algorithms iteratively refine the bias and prestige scores
of the nodes. The final bias and prestige vector is obtained
when the algorithm converges. The main contributions of
this paper are summarized as follows.
• First, we propose a framework of algorithms for com-
puting the bias and prestige of the nodes in either un-
signed or signed trust networks. We rigorously prove
the convergence properties of our framework.
• Second, based on the proposed framework, we show
that MB [23] is a special case of our framework for
unsigned trust networks. We also develop four new al-
gorithms that can overcome the cancellation problem
in MB. The bias measurements of our new algorithms
are more reasonable, and our algorithms are more ef-
fective and more robust than MB.
• Third, we conducted extensive experimental studies to
confirm the effectiveness, robustness, and scalability of
the proposed algorithms. We compare our algorithms
with the state-of-the-art algorithm (MB) over five real
datasets. The results indicate that our newly proposed
algorithms outperform MB in terms of both effective-
ness and robustness. We also evaluate the scalability of
the proposed algorithms, and the results demonstrate
the scalability of our algorithms is linear w.r.t. the size
of the graphs.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We intro-
duce the related work in Section 2. We give the preliminaries
and problem statement, and discuss the drawbacks of the ex-
isting algorithms in Section 3. We propose and analyze the
algorithm framework as well as four novel specific algorithms
in Section 4. Extensive experimental results are presented
in Section 5. Finally, we conclude this work in Section 6.
2. RELATED WORK
Our work is closely related to graph-based ranking algo-
rithms. In the last decades, ranking nodes in networks has
attracted much attention in both research and industry com-
munities. There are a large number of algorithms, such as
HITS [17], PageRank [5] and its variants [10, 12]. Most of
these ranking algorithms are based on the spectral of the
adjacency matrix of the network. A survey on using spec-
tral techniques for ranking can be found in [27]. However,
all of these algorithms only focus on finding the prestige
of the nodes in the networks, and do not consider the bias
of the nodes, thus cannot be directly used in our problem.
In addition, the convergence of these algorithms is guaran-
teed by the non-negative matrix theory [18]. Therefore, they
cannot be directly generalized to the signed trust networks
[20], where the edges are possibly associated with a neg-
ative weight. A straightforward method is to remove the
negative edges, and then perform the ranking algorithms on
the non-negative graph. Obviously, this method ignores the
negative relationship between the nodes of the graph, and
may result in poor ranking performance [9]. To address this
issue, de Kerchove et al. [6] propose a Pagetrust algorithm,
which can handle the negative edges, but the convergence of
their algorithm cannot be guaranteed.
Our work is also related to the trust management [14, 29,
13, 3]. Richardson et al. in [25] propose an eigenvector based
algorithm for the trust management in semantic web. Inde-
pendent to Richardson’s work, Kamvar et al. in [15] present
a similar eigenvector based algorithm, namely Eigentrust,
for the trust management in P2P networks. Guha et al. in
[9] study the problem of propagation of trust and distrust
in the networks. Subsequently, Theodorakopoulos et al. in
[26] study the trust model and trust evaluation metrics from
an algebra viewpoint. They use semiring to express a trust
model and then model the trust evaluation problem as a
path problem on a directed graph. Recently, Andersen et al.
in [1] propose an axiomatic approach for the trust based rec-
ommendation systems [21]. All of these algorithms are based
on the spectral techniques, and cannot be easily generalized
to the signed networks. There also exist trust based rank-
ing algorithms [22]. These algorithms are designed based on
the same idea “the users whose opinions often differ from
the others’ opinions will be assigned to less trust scores”. In
the literature, such algorithms include [24, 19, 28, 7, 30].
All of these algorithms are tailored for the bipartite rating
networks, and generalization to the general networks would
be meaningless. Moreover, all of them except [7] cannot
guarantee the convergence. As an exception, in [7], de Ker-
chove and Dooren prove the convergence of their algorithm,
but the rate of the convergence is q-linear. In addition, the
convergence property of their algorithm [7] is dependent on
the decay constant, which is very hard to be determined in
practice.
3. PRELIMINARIES
We model a trust network as a directed weighted graph
G = (V,E,W ) with n nodes and m edges, where V repre-
sents the node set, E denotes the edge set, and W denotes
the weights. In graph G, a weight Wij signifies a trust score
from node i to node j. All trust scores are normalized in the
range of [0, 1]. For simplicity, in the following discussions, we
focus on an unsigned trust network assuming that all edge-
weights are non-negative. Our approaches can be readily
generalized to signed trust networks, and we will discuss it
in Section 4.4.
An example is shown in Fig. 1. In Fig. 1, node 5 gives a
trust score 0.1 to node 1 (W51 = 0.1), whereas two nodes, 2
and 3, give a high trust score 0.8 to node 1 (W21 = W31 =
0.8). And node 5 gives a trust score 0.9 to node 3 (W53 =
0.9), while two nodes, 2 and 4, give a low trust score to
node 3 instead (W23 = W43 = 0.2). This observation shows
that node 5’s opinions often differ from those of others, thus
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Figure 1: A trust network.
indicates that node 5 is a biased node. On the other hand,
there are two nodes (2 and 3) giving a high trust score 0.8
to node 1 (W21 = W31 = 0.8), which suggests that node 1
would be a prestigious node. Additionally, in this example,
node 3 gives 0 to node 2 (W32 = 0), which implies that node
3 does not trust node 2 at all.
Given a trust network G, the problem we study is how
to compute the bias and prestige of the nodes based on the
trust scores. As discussed, the eigenvector based methods
are not applicable, and the only existing solution is MB [23].
In the following, we briefly review MB and discuss its major
drawbacks.
In MB, each node has two scores: the bias and prestige
score. The bias and prestige scores of node i are denoted
by bi and ri, respectively. Formally, the bias of node i is
defined by
bi =
1
2|Oi|
∑
j∈Oi
(Wij − rj), (1)
where Oi denotes the set of all outgoing neighbors of node
i. The idea behind is that a node will be assigned to a high
bias score if it often behaves differently from others. The
prestige score of node i (ri) is given by
ri =
1
|Ii|
∑
j∈Ii
(Wji(1−max{0, bj × sign(Wji)})), (2)
where Ii denotes the set of all incoming neighbors of node
i, and sign(Wji) denotes the sign of an edge from node j to
node i, which can be positive (trust) or negative (distrust).
The MB algorithm works in an iterative fashion, and the
corresponding iterative system is


rk+1i =
1
|Ii|
∑
j∈Ii
(Wji(1−max{0, b
k
j × sign(Wji)}))
bk+1j =
1
2|Oj |
∑
i∈Oj
(Wji − r
k+1
i )
(3)
There are two major drawbacks in MB. First, in Eq. (1),
the differences (Wij − rj) for different outgoing neighbors
j ∈ Oi can be canceled out, thus will result in unreasonable
bias measures. Reconsider the example (Fig. 1), node 5 gives
0.1 to node 1, while both node 2 and node 3 give 0.8 to node
1. With these three edges (5 → 1, 2 → 1, and 3 → 1),
the trust score given by node 5 is significantly lower than
those of others with a difference 0.1− 0.8 = −0.7. However,
consider the other three edges 2→ 3, 4→ 3, and 5→ 3, we
can find that the trust score given by node 5 is significantly
larger than those of the other two nodes (nodes 2 and 4)
with a difference 0.7. The positive and negative differences
can be canceled out by Eq. (1), and this will cause node 5
to be trusted with a lower bias score. However, intuitively,
node 5’s opinions often differ from those of others, thereby
Table 1: Bias scores by the MB algorithm.
Iteration node 1 node 2 node 3 node 4 node 5
1 0.350 0.042 0.121 0.250 0.042
2 0.350 0.015 0.129 0.232 0.015
3 0.350 0.014 0.129 0.231 0.014
4 0.350 0.014 0.129 0.231 0.014
it should be assigned to a large bias score. Table 1 shows
the bias scores by MB after each iteration. We can clearly
see that node 5 gets the minimal bias scores (0.014), which
contradicts to the intuition.
Second, as also pointed in [23], MB is easy to be attacked
by the adversarial nodes. For example, some nodes can
maintain their bias scores closely to 0 by giving high trust
scores to the nodes with low prestige scores and giving the
low trust scores to the nodes with high prestige scores (as
node 5 in Fig. 1). In [23], Mishra and Bhattacharya present a
statistical method for detecting such adversarial nodes. But
the statistical method is independent to MB, thus it cannot
reduce the influence of the adversarial nodes in MB. In ad-
dition, the proof for the convergence of the MB presented
in [23] is not rigorous. In the present paper, we rigorously
prove the convergence of our framework using the Cauthy
convergence theorem [2].
4. OUR NEW APPROACH
In this section, we propose a framework of algorithms for
computing the bias and prestige of the nodes in trust net-
works. In our framework, every node i has two scores: the
bias score (bi) and the prestige score (ri). We use two vec-
tors b and r to denote the bias vector and prestige vector,
respectively. Specifically, we define the bias of node j by
bj = (f(r))j , (4)
where r is the prestige vector of the nodes, f(r) : Rn →
R
n is a vector-valued contractive function, which is defined
in Definition 4.1, and (f(r))j denotes the j-th element of
vector f(r). We restrict 0 ≤ f(r) ≤ e, where e ∈ Rn and
e = [1, 1, · · · , 1]T .
Definition 4.1: For any x, y ∈ Rn, the function f : Rn →
R
n is a vector-valued contractive function if the following
condition holds.
|f(x)− f(y)| ≤ λ||x− y||∞e (5)
where λ ∈ [0, 1), || • ||∞ denotes the infinity norm.
Since λ ∈ [0, 1), the vector-valued function f exhibits con-
tractive property w.r.t. the infinity norm of the vector, we
refer to it as the vector-valued contractive function. It is
worth noting that the vector-valued contractive function we
define is a generalization of the contraction mapping in the
fixed point theory [8]. In [8], the contraction mapping is de-
fined on a 1-dimensional variable and the domain of the con-
traction mapping is also a 1-dimensional value. Our vector-
valued contractive function is defined on an n-dimensional
vector and its domain is also an n-dimensional vector. The
contraction mapping is very useful for iterative function sys-
tems [8]. Our vector-valued contractive function sheds light
on studying the iterative vector-valued function systems in
trust networks.
As can be seen in Eq. (4), the bias vector b is obtained by
a vector-valued contractive function defined on the prestige
vector r. The advantage of the definition of bias is that
it makes our framework general, which will result in a rich
family of bias measurements. In Section 4.2, we will give four
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different bias measurements and each of these measurements
is shown to be a vector-valued contractive function.
With the bias of the nodes, the trustworthiness of node j
is given by 1− bj , which is inversely proportional to the bias
score of node j. We compute the prestige score of node i by
averaging the trustworthiness-weighted trust scores given by
the incoming neighbors of node i. In particular, the prestige
score ri for a node i is given by
ri =
1
|Ii|
∑
j∈Ii
Wji(1− (f(r))j), (6)
where Ii is the set of all incoming neighbors of node i. Our
algorithm iteratively refines the prestige vector and the bias
vector using the following iterative system:


rk+1i =
1
|Ii|
∑
j∈Ii
Wji(1− b
k
j )
bk+1j = (f(r
k+1))j
(7)
where rk+1i denotes the prestige of node i in the (k+1)-th
iteration and bk+1j denotes the bias of node j in the (k+1)-
th iteration. Initially, we set f(r0) = 0, which implies 0 ≤
rk ≤ 1. The iterative system (Eq. (7)) will converge into a
unique fixed prestige and bias vector in an exponential rate
of convergence, as we will show in Section 4.1.
4.1 Analysis of the proposed algorithm
Convergence of the proposed algorithm: We analyze
the convergence properties of the iterative system described
in Eq. (7). Specifically, we show the prestige vector will
converge into a unique fixed point as stated in Theorem 4.1.
Similar arguments can be used to prove the bias vector also
converges into a unique fixed point. First, we prove the
following lemma.
Lemma 4.1: For any node i, |rk+1i −r
k
i | ≤ λ
k||r1−r0||∞.
Proof: We prove Lemma 4.1 by induction. Let k = 1, we
have
|r2i − r
1
i | = |
1
|Ii|
∑
j∈Ii
Wji((f(r
0))j − (f(r
1))j)|
≤ 1
|Ii|
∑
j∈Ii
Wji|(f(r
0))j − (f(r
1))j |
≤ λ
|Ii|
∑
j∈Ii
Wji||r
1 − r0||∞
≤ λ||r1 − r0||∞,
where the second inequality is due to the definition of vector-
valued contractive function, and the last inequality is by
|Wij | ∈ [0, 1]. Assume the lemma holds when k = t. We
show that the lemma still holds when k = t+ 1.
|rt+2i − r
t+1
i | = |
1
|Ii|
∑
j∈Ii
Wji((f(r
t))j − (f(r
t+1))j)|
≤ 1
|Ii|
∑
j∈Ii
Wji|(f(r
t))j − (f(r
t+1))j |
≤ λ
|Ii|
∑
j∈Ii
Wji||r
t+1 − rt||∞
≤ λ||rt+1 − rt||∞
≤ λt+1||r1 − r0||∞,
where the second inequality is due to the definition of vector-
valued contractive function and the last inequality holds by
the induction assumption. This completes the proof. ✷
With Lemma 4.1, we prove the convergence property.
Theorem 4.1: The iterative system defined in Eq. (7) con-
verges into a unique fixed point.
Proof: We first prove the convergence of the iterative sys-
tem (Eq. (7)), and then prove the uniqueness. Specifically,
for ε > 0, there exists N such that
λN <
(1− λ)ε
||r1 − r0||∞
.
Then, for any s > t ≥ N , we have
|rsi − r
t
i | ≤ |r
s
i − r
s−1
i |+ |r
s−1
i − r
s−2
i |+ · · ·+ |r
t+1
i − r
t
i |
≤ λs−1||r1 − r0||∞ + λ
s−2||r1 − r0||∞ + · · ·+
λt||r1 − r0||∞
≤ ||r1 − r0||∞λ
t
s−t−1∑
k=0
λk < ||r1 − r0||∞λ
t
∞∑
k=0
λk
= ||r1 − r0||∞λ
t 1
1−λ
≤ ||r1 − r0||∞λ
N 1
1−λ
≤ ε,
where the first inequality holds by the triangle inequality,
and the second inequality is due to Lemma 4.1. Then, by
Cauchy convergence theorem [2], we conclude that the se-
quence rkα converges to a fixed point. For the uniqueness,
we prove it by contradiction. Suppose Eq. (7) has at least
two fixed points. Let r(1) and r(2) be two fixed points, and
M = |r
(1)
i − r
(2)
i | = ||r
(1) − r(2)||∞. Then, we have
M = | 1
|Ii|
∑
j∈Ii
Wji((f(r
(1)))j − (f(r
(2)))j)|
≤ 1
|Ii|
∑
j∈Ii
Wji|((f(r
(1)))j − (f(r
(2)))j)|
≤ λ
|Ii|
∑
j∈Ii
Wji||r
(1) − r(2)||∞
≤ λ||r(1) − r(2)||∞ = λM.
Since λ ∈ [0, 1), thusM < M , which is a contradiction. This
completes the proof. ✷
The rate of the convergence: We show that our algo-
rithms will converge in exponential rate by the following
lemmas.
Lemma 4.2: ||r∞ − rk||∞ ≤ λ
k||r∞ − r0||∞.
Proof: We prove the lemma by induction. For k = 1, let
|r∞i − r
1
i | = ||r
∞ − r1||∞, then we have
|r∞i − r
1
i | = |
1
|Ii|
∑
j∈Ii
Wji((f(r
0))j − (f(r
∞))j)|
≤ 1
|Ii|
∑
j∈Ii
Wji|(f(r
0))j − (f(r
∞))j)|
≤ λ
|Ii|
∑
j∈Ii
Wji||r
∞ − r0||∞ ≤ λ||r
∞ − r0||∞
The last inequality holds by the definition of vector-valued
contractive function. Suppose k = t, we have ||r∞−rt||∞ ≤
λt||r∞− r0||∞. Then, when k = t+1, for any node u of the
graph, we have
|r∞u − r
t+1
u | = |
1
|Iu|
∑
j∈Iu
Wju((f(r
t))j − (f(r
∞))j)|
≤ 1
|Iu|
∑
j∈Iu
Wju|(f(r
t))j − (f(r
∞))j)|
≤ λ
|Iu|
∑
j∈Iu
Wju||r
∞ − rt||∞
≤ λ||r∞ − rt||∞ ≤ λ
t+1||r∞ − r0||∞.
Thus, we have ||r∞ − rt||∞ ≤ λ
t+1||r∞ − r0||∞. This com-
pletes the proof. ✷
Lemma 4.3: ||ra − rb||∞ ≤ 1.
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Proof: By definition, for any t, f(rt) ≤ e holds. Thus, we
conclude ||ra − rb||∞ ≤ 1. ✷
With the above lemma, we readily have the following
corollary.
Corollary 4.3: ||r∞ − rk||∞ ≤ λ
k.
By Corollary 4.3, our algorithms converge in exponential
rate. We can determine the maximal steps that are needed
for convergence. Assume ri is the true prestige score of
node i. Our goal is to show that after a particular number
of iterations k, the prestige score given by our algorithm
converges to ri as desired. Formally, for ε→ 0, let |ri−r
k
i | ≤
ε. By Corollary 4.3, we can set
k = logλ ε. (8)
This implies that the number of iterations k is a very small
constant to guarantee convergence of our proposed algo-
rithms. This also leads to the linear time complexity of
our algorithms as we will discuss in Section 4.3.
4.2 Instances of f(r)
In this section, we first show that MB is a special instance
of our framework on unsigned trust networks. Then, based
on our framework, we present four new algorithms that can
circumvent the existing problems of MB. The proofs in this
section are given in Appendix.
To show that MB on the unsigned trust network is a spe-
cial instance of our algorithm, we show that fmb(r) is a
vector-valued contractive function. The fmb(r) is defined
by
(fmb(r))j = max{0,
1
2|Oj |
∑
i∈Oj
(Wji − ri)},
for j = 1, 2, · · · , n. In particular, we have the following
theorem.
Theorem 4.2: For any r ∈ Rn, and r ≤ e, fmb is a vector-
valued contractive function with the decay constant λ = 1/2
and 0 ≤ fmb ≤ e.
As analysis in the previous section, MB yields unreason-
able bias measurement and it is easy to be attacked by the
adversarial nodes. In the following, we propose four new
algorithms that can tackle the existing problems in MB.
Specifically, we give two classes of vector-valued contractive
functions: the L1 distance based vector-valued contractive
functions and the L2 distance based vector-valued contrac-
tive functions. All functions can be served as (f(rk+1))j in
Eq. (7). That is to say, all of these functions can be used to
measure the bias of the nodes.
L1 distance based contractive functions: We present
two vector-valued contractive functions based on the L1 dis-
tance measure: f1(r) and f2(r). Specifically,
(f1(r))j =
λ
|Oj |
∑
i∈Oj
|Wji − ri|, (9)
for all j = 1, 2, · · · , n. In the following theorem, we show
that f1 is a vector-valued contractive function.
Theorem 4.3: For any r ∈ Rn, and r ≤ e, f1 is a vector-
valued contractive function with 0 ≤ f1 ≤ e.
Based on f1, the bias of node j is determined by the arith-
metic average of the differences between the trust scores
given by node j and the corresponding prestige scores of the
outgoing neighbors of node j. The rationale is that the nodes
Table 2: Bias scores by the L1-AVG algorithm.
Iteration node 1 node 2 node 3 node 4 node 5
1 0.115 0.200 0.292 0.111 0.207
2 0.005 0.130 0.137 0.060 0.220
3 0.019 0.117 0.098 0.054 0.233
4 0.018 0.113 0.089 0.054 0.237
5 0.018 0.113 0.089 0.054 0.237
whose trust scores often differ from those of other nodes will
be assigned to high bias scores. In f1, the difference is mea-
sured by the L1 distance, thus we refer to this algorithm
as the L1 average trustworthiness-weighted algorithm (L1-
AVG). The corresponding iterative system is given by


rk+1i =
1
|Ii|
∑
j∈Ii
Wji(1− (f1(r
k))j)
(f1(r
k+1))j =
λ
|Oj |
∑
i∈Oj
|Wji − r
k+1
i |.
(10)
It is important to note that, unlike MB, L1-AVG uses the
L1 distance to measure the differences, thus the differences
between the trust score and the corresponding prestige score
cannot be canceled out. It therefore can readily prevent at-
tacks from the adversarial nodes that give the nodes with
high prestige low trust scores and give the nodes with low
prestige high trust scores. Table 2 shows the bias scores of
the nodes for the example in Fig. 1 by L1-AVG. For fair
comparison with MB, we set λ = 0.5 in all of our algorithms
in this experiment. We can clearly see that node 5 achieves
the highest bias score, which conforms with our intuition.
Also, we can observe that L1-AVG converges in 5 iterations,
because the rate of convergence of our framework is expo-
nential.
The second L1-distance based vector-valued contractive
function is defined by
(f2(r))j = λmax
i∈Oj
|Wji − ri|, (11)
for all j = 1, 2, · · · , n. Below, we show that f2 is a vector-
valued contractive function.
Theorem 4.4: For any r ∈ Rn, and r ≤ e, f2 is a vector-
valued contractive function with 0 ≤ f2 ≤ e.
In f2, since the bias of node j is determined by the maxi-
mal difference between the trust scores given by node j and
the corresponding prestige score of the outgoing neighbors
of node j, we refer to this algorithm as the L1 maximal
trustworthiness-weighted algorithm (L1-MAX). The corre-
sponding iterative system is as follows.


rk+1i =
1
|Ii|
∑
j∈Ii
Wji(1− (f2(r
k))j)
(f2(r
k+1))j = λmax
i∈Oj
|Wji − r
k+1
i |.
(12)
With Eq. (11), we can see that L1-MAX punishes the biased
nodes more heavily than L1-AVG, as it takes the maximal
difference to measure the bias. In other words, in L1-MAX,
the node that only gives one unreasonable trust score will
get high bias score. Like L1-AVG, L1-MAX can also prevent
attacks from the adversarial nodes that give the nodes with
high prestige low trust scores, and give the nodes with low
prestige high scores. Table 3 shows the bias scores of the
nodes for the example in Fig. 1 by L1-MAX. We can see
that node 5 gets the highest bias score as desired. L1-MAX
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Table 3: Bias scores by the L1-MAX algorithm.
Iteration node 1 node 2 node 3 node 4 node 5
1 0.115 0.343 0.343 0.165 0.407
2 0.000 0.215 0.215 0.050 0.311
3 0.020 0.179 0.179 0.061 0.289
4 0.017 0.169 0.169 0.065 0.285
5 0.017 0.169 0.169 0.065 0.285
converges in 5 iterations, because the rate of convergence of
our framework is exponential.
L2 distance based contractive functions: We propose
two contractive functions based on the square of L2 distance
measure. For convenience, we refer to these functions as L2
distance based contractive functions. Since the L2 distance
based algorithms are defined in a similar fashion as the L1
distance based algorithms, we omit explanation unless nec-
essary. The first L2 distance based contractive function is
given by the following equation.
(f3(r))j =
λ
2|Oj |
∑
i∈Oj
(Wji − ri)
2, (13)
for all j = 1, 2, · · · , n. We can also prove the f3 is a vector-
valued contractive function.
Theorem 4.5: For any r ∈ Rn, and r ≤ e, f3(r) is a
vector-valued contractive function with 0 ≤ f3(r) ≤ e.
Similarly, in f3, the bias of node j is determined by the
arithmetic average of the difference between the trust scores
given by node j and the corresponding prestige score of the
outgoing neighbors of node j. However, unlike f1 and f2,
in f3, the difference is measured by the square of L2 dis-
tance. Thus, we refer to this algorithm as the L2 average
trustworthiness-weighted algorithm (L2-AVG). The corre-
sponding iterative system is


rk+1i =
1
|Ii|
∑
j∈Ii
Wji(1− (f3(r
k))j)
(f3(r
k+1))j =
λ
2|Oj |
∑
i∈Oj
(Wji − r
k+1
i )
2.
(14)
The second L2 distance based vector-valued contractive
function is defined by
(f4(r))j =
λ
2
max
i∈Oj
(Wji − ri)
2, (15)
for all j = 1, 2, · · · , n. Likewise, we have the following the-
orem.
Theorem 4.6: For any r ∈ Rn, and r ≤ e, f4(r) is a
vector-valued contractive function with 0 ≤ f4(r) ≤ e.
The corresponding iterative system is


rk+1i =
1
|Ii|
∑
j∈Ii
Wji(1− (f4(r
k))j)
(f4(r
k+1))j =
λ
2
max
i∈Oj
(Wji − r
k+1
i )
2.
(16)
Similar to L1-MAX, we refer to this algorithm as the L2
maximal trustworthiness-weighted algorithm (L2-MAX).
We depict the prestige scores by different algorithms in
Table 4. We can observe that the rank of the prestige scores
by our algorithms is the same as the rank by AA (Arithmetic
average) algorithm in Fig. 1, and also it is strongly correlated
Table 4: Prestige scores by different algorithms.
Algorithm node 1 node 2 node 3 node 4 node 5
AA 0.567 0.000 0.433 0.600 0.350
HITS 1.000 0.000 0.401 0.391 0.027
PageRank 0.224 0.030 0.305 0.141 0.300
MB 0.532 0.000 0.433 0.523 0.350
L1-AVG 0.502 0.000 0.352 0.541 0.336
L1-MAX 0.461 0.000 0.331 0.492 0.335
L2-AVG 0.558 0.000 0.416 0.594 0.349
L2-MAX 0.556 0.000 0.414 0.591 0.348
to MB. Note that all of our algorithms give zero prestige
score to node 2, as node 2 obtains zero trust score from
his/her incoming neighbors.
4.3 Complexity of the proposed algorithms
In this section, we analyze the time and space complexi-
ties of L1-AVG. For the other algorithms, it is not hard to
show that the time and space complexities are the same as
L1-AVG. First, the time complexity for computing the pres-
tige score of node i in one iteration is O(|I¯ ||O¯|), where |I¯|
and |O¯| denote the average in-degree and out-degree of all
nodes respectively. The amortized time complexity in one
iteration is O(m), where m denotes the number of edges in
the graph. Therefore, the total time complexity of L1-AVG
is O(km), where k denotes the number of iterations that are
needed to guarantee convergence. As analyzed in Section
4.1, k is a very small constant. And k = 15 can guarantee
the algorithms converge as shown in our experiments. The
analysis implies that the time complexity of our algorithms
is linear w.r.t. the size of the graph. Second, we only need to
store the graph, the prestige vector (r), and the contractive
function f(r), thus the space complexity is O(m + n). In
summary, our algorithms have linear time and space com-
plexities, thereby they can be scalable to large graphs.
4.4 Generalizing to signed trust networks
Our algorithms can be generalized to signed trust net-
works. In signed trust networks, there exist two types of
edges: the positive edge and the negative edge. In other
words, the weights of positive (negative) edges are positive
(negative). In practice, many trust networks, such as Slash-
dot and Epinions, are signed trust networks, where the neg-
ative edges signify distrust. Without loss of generality, we
assume that the weights of the edges have been scaled into [-
1, 1]. It is easy to verify that Lemma 4.1, Theorem 4.1, and
Lemma 4.2 still hold in signed trust networks. Therefore,
our iterative algorithms converge into a unique fixed point
in the context of signed trust networks. Moreover, the rate
of convergence is exponential. Notice that this result holds
if the function f is a vector-valued contractive function. In
signed trust networks, it is easy to check that the functions
f1 and f2 are still the vector-valued contractive functions,
but the f3 and f4 are not. However, we can readily modify
them to the vector-valued contractive functions, which are
denoted by f∗3 and f
∗
4 respectively, by adjusting the decay
constant. Specifically, we have
(f∗3 (r))j =
λ
4|Oj |
∑
i∈Oj
(Wji − ri)
2
(f∗4 (r))j =
λ
4
max
i∈Oj
(Wji − ri)
2.
It is easy to verify that f∗3 (r) and f
∗
4 (r) are vector-valued
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Table 5: Summary of the datasets
Name Nodes Edges Ref.
Kaitiaki 64 178 -
Epinions 131,828 841,372 [20]
Slashdot1 77,350 516,575 [20]
Slashdot2 81,867 545, 671 [20]
Slashdot3 82,140 549,202 [20]
contractive functions in signed trust networks.
5. EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we evaluate the effectiveness, robustness
and scalability of our algorithms.
5.1 Experimental setup
Datasets: We conduct our experiments on five real datasets.
(1) Kaitiaki dataset: We collect the Kaitiaki dataset from
Trustlet (www.trustlet.org). This dataset is a trust net-
work dataset, where the trust statements are weighted at
four different levels (0.4, 0.6, 0.8, and 1.0). (2) Epinions
dataset: We download it from Stanford network analysis
data collections (http://snap.stanford.edu). It is a signed
trust network dataset, where the users can trust or distrust
the other users. (3) Slashdot datasets: we collect three dif-
ferent datasets from Stanford network analysis data collec-
tions. All of these three datasets are signed trust networks,
where the users can give trust or distrust scores to the oth-
ers. Table 5 summarizes the detailed statistical information
of the datasets.
Parameter settings and experimental environment:
We set the decay constant λ = 0.5 for a fair comparison with
MB. For the decay constant of the PageRank algorithm, we
set it to 0.85, as it is widely used in web search. All the
experiments are conducted on a Windows Server 2008 with
4x6-core Intel Xeon 2.66 Ghz CPU, and 128 memory. All
algorithms are implemented by MATLAB 2010a and Visual
C++ 6.0.
5.2 Experimental results
Comparison of bias score: Here we compare the bias
scores by our algorithms with the bias scores by MB. First,
we use the variance of the trust scores given by node i to
measure the bias of the node i, as used in [23]. Specifically,
we define the variance as follows:
var(i) =
1
|Oi|
∑
j∈Oi
(Wij − r¯j)
2, (17)
where r¯j =
1
|Ij |
∑
i∈Ij
Wij . Second, we rank the nodes by their
variance and use this rank as the “ground truth”. Note that
there is no ground truth for the bias score of the nodes in
any datasets. We use the variance as the ground truth. The
reason is twofold. On one hand, the variance is an intuitive
metric for measuring the bias of the node, and the node hav-
ing a larger variance implies that the node has a larger bias
score. On the other hand, the variance has been successfully
used for analyzing the bias of the node in trust networks [23].
Third, we rank the nodes by their bias scores obtained by our
algorithms and obtained by MB, respectively. Specifically,
for MB, we rank the nodes by the absolute value of the bias
scores (|bi| in Eq. (1)). Finally, we compare our algorithms
with MB in terms of AUC (the area under the ROC curve)
Table 6: Comparison of bias by our algorithms and
MB algorithm under AUC metric (top 5% nodes of
the dataset).
Datasets L1-AVG L1-MAX L2-AVG L2-MAX MB
Kaitiaki 1.000 0.937 1.000 0.925 1.000
Epinions 0.994 0.982 0.994 0.982 0.949
Slashdot1 0.993 0.970 0.993 0.970 0.895
Slashdot2 0.992 0.975 0.992 0.975 0.903
Slashdot3 0.992 0.975 0.992 0.975 0.903
Table 7: Comparison of bias by our algorithms and
MB algorithm under Kendall Tau metric.
Datasets L1-AVG L1-MAX L2-AVG L2-MAX MB
Kaitiaki 0.728 0.713 0.812 0.709 0.726
Epinions 0.781 0.754 0.783 0.754 0.733
Slashdot1 0.811 0.776 0.812 0.776 0.734
Slashdot2 0.722 0.688 0.721 0.688 0.642
Slashdot3 0.820 0.787 0.821 0.787 0.721
[11] and Kendall Tau [16] metric, where the AUC metric
is used to evaluate the top-K rank (in our experiments, we
consider the top-5% nodes) and the Kendall Tau metric is
employed to evaluate the rank correlation between the rank
by the proposed algorithms and the ground truth.
Table 6 and Table 7 show the comparison of bias by our
algorithms and MB under AUC and Kendall Tau metric,
respectively. From Table 6, we can see that L1-AVG and
L2-AVG achieve the best performance. In signed trust net-
works, the performance of our algorithms are significantly
better than MB. For example, L2-AVG boosts AUC over
MB by 4.7%, 11%, 9.9%, and 9.7% in Epinions, Slashdot1,
Slashdot2 and Slashdot3, respectively. The results indicate
that our algorithms are more effective than MB for comput-
ing the bias of the nodes. This is because the bias mea-
surements of our algorithms are more reasonable than the
bias measurement of MB. Interestingly, L1-AVG and L2-
AVG achieve the same performance under the AUC metric.
In general, L1-AVG and L2-AVG outperform L1-MAX and
L2-MAX in our datasets. From Table 7, we can observe that
all the algorithms exhibit positive correlation to the ground
truth. L2-AVG achieves the best performance in Kaitiaki,
Epinions, Slashdot1, and Slashdot3 datasets, while in Slash-
dot2 dataset L1-AVG achieves the best performance. It is
important to note that all of our algorithms significantly out-
perform MB in signed networks. For instance, L2-AVG im-
proves Kendall Tau over MB by 11.9%, 6.8%, 10.1%, 12.3%,
and 13.9% in Kaitiaki, Epinions, Slashdot1, Slashdot2 and
Slashdot3, respectively. The results further confirm that
our algorithms are more effective than MB for computing
the bias of the node in trust networks.
Comparison of prestige score: We compare the prestige
scores by our algorithms with those by MB. Specifically, we
use the arithmetic average (AA), HITS [17], and PageRank
[5] as the baselines, and then compare the rank correlation
between the rank by our algorithms (here we rank the nodes
according to their prestige scores) and the rank by the base-
lines using Kendall Tau metric. Here, AA ranks the nodes by
the average trust scores obtained from the incoming neigh-
bors, and HITS ranks the nodes by their authority scores.
In signed trust networks, we remove the signed edges for
HITS and PageRank, as these algorithms cannot work on
signed trust networks directly. Similar processing has been
used in [23]. Fig. 2 and Fig. 3 depict the comparison of pres-
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Figure 2: Comparison of prestige by our algorithms
and MB algorithm on Kaitiaki dataset.
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Figure 3: Comparison of prestige by our algorithms
and MB algorithm on signed trust networks.
tige score by our algorithms and MB on Kaitiaki and signed
trust networks, respectively.
From Fig. 2, we can clearly see that our algorithms achieve
the best rank correlation to AA. By comparing the Kendall
Tau between different algorithms (our algorithms and MB)
and HITS, we find that L1-AVG achieves the best rank cor-
relation. However, by comparing the Kendall Tau between
different algorithms and PageRank, we clearly find that L1-
MAX achieves the best rank correlation. From Fig. 3, we can
also observe that our algorithms achieve the best rank cor-
relation to AA. By comparing the rank correlation between
different algorithms and HITS/PageRank, we find that our
algorithms are slightly better than MB on the signed trust
network datasets. These results suggest that our algorithms
are more effective to measure the prestige of the nodes than
MB. Interestingly, all of our algorithms achieve the same
performance in signed trust networks.
Robustness testing: To evaluate the robustness of our
algorithms, we first add some noisy data into the original
datasets. Specifically, we randomly select some nodes as the
spamming nodes, and then modify the trust scores given
by the spamming nodes. For the spamming nodes, we ran-
domly give high trust score to his/her out-neighbors whose
average trust score is low, and randomly give low trust score
to his/her outgoing neighbors whose average trust score is
high. Second, we perform our algorithms and MB on both
original and noisy datasets, and then calculate the Kendall
Tau for each algorithm. Here the Kendall Tau is computed
on two ranks that are yielded by an algorithm on the orig-
inal datasets and the noisy datasets, respectively. Finally,
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Figure 4: Robustness of bias by our algorithms and
MB algorithm on Epinions dataset.
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Figure 5: Robustness of prestige by our algorithms
and MB algorithm on Epinions dataset.
we compare the Kendall Tau among all algorithms. Intu-
itively, the larger Kendall Tau the algorithm achieves, the
more robust the algorithm is.
We test our algorithms and MB on both original and noisy
datasets with 5% to 20% spamming ratio. Fig. 4 and Fig. 5
describe the robustness of the bias and the prestige of the
algorithms by Kendall Tau vs. spamming ratio on Epinions
dataset, respectively. Similar results can be obtained from
other datasets. From Fig. 4 and Fig. 5, we can clearly see
that all of our algorithms are significantly more robust than
MB. For the bias, L2-MAX achieves the best robustness,
followed by the L1-MAX, L2-AVG, L1-AVG, and then MB.
For the prestige, all of our algorithms achieve the same ro-
bustness, and are significantly more robust than MB. These
results confirm our analysis in Section 3. Moreover, the gap
of robustness between our algorithms and MB increases as
the spamming ratio increases, which suggests that our algo-
rithms are more effective than MB on the datasets with high
spamming ratio. In general, the robustness of the algorithms
decrease as the spamming ratio increases.
Scalability: We evaluate the scalability of our algorithms
on the Epinions dataset. Similar results can be obtained
from other datasets. For evaluating the scalability, we first
generate three subgraphs in terms of the following rule. First,
we randomly select 25% nodes and the corresponding edges
of the original graph as the first dataset, and then add an-
other 25% nodes to generate the second dataset, and then
based on the second dataset, we add another 25% nodes to
generate the third dataset. Then, we perform our algorithms
on this three datasets and the original dataset. Fig. 6 shows
our results. From Fig. 6, we can clearly see that our algo-
rithms scales linearly w.r.t. the size of the graph. This result
conforms with our complexity analysis in Section 4.3.
Effect of parameter λ: We discuss the effectiveness of
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Figure 6: Scalability of the proposed algorithms.
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parameter λ in our algorithms on Kaitiaki dataset. Similar
results can be observed from other datasets. Fig. 7 shows
the effectiveness of our algorithms w.r.t. λ, where the ef-
fectiveness is measured by the rank correlation between our
algorithms and the baselines using the Kendall Tau metric.
Specifically, Fig. 7(a) depicts the bias correlation between
our algorithms and the variance based algorithm (Eq. (17))
under various λ, while Figs. 7(b), (c), and (d) show the pres-
tige correlation between our algorithms and AA, HITS, and
PageRank under different λ, respectively. From Fig. 7(a),
we find that L2-MAX is quite robust w.r.t. λ, while the
performance of L2-AVG decreases as λ increases. In addi-
tion, we find that L1-AVG and L1-MAX are slightly sensi-
tive w.r.t. λ, because the differences between the maximal
and minimal bias correlation of these two algorithms do not
exceed 0.1. For the prestige scores (Figs. 7(b), (c), and (d)),
we can clearly see that L2-AVG and L2-MAX are more ro-
bust w.r.t. λ, whereas L1-AVG and L1-MAX are sensitive
w.r.t. λ. For instance, consider the prestige correlation with
PageRank (Fig. 7(d)), we can observe that the performance
of L1-AVG decreases as λ increases. However, the perfor-
mance of L1-MAX increases as λ increases when λ ≤ 0.8,
and otherwise it decreases as λ increases. To summarize,
the L2 distance based algorithms are more robust w.r.t. the
parameter λ than the L1 distance based algorithms.
6. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose a framework of algorithms to cal-
culate the bias and prestige of the nodes in trust networks.
Our framework is general and includes a rich family of algo-
rithms. We show that the MB algorithm [23] is a special case
of our framework on unsigned trust networks. Furthermore,
we propose four new algorithms based on our framework to
circumvent the existing problems of the MB algorithm. Our
algorithms are more effective and more robust than the MB
algorithm. In addition, all of our algorithms are scalable to
handle large datasets, as they have linear time and space
complexities w.r.t. the size of the network. Extensive exper-
iments on five real datasets demonstrate the effectiveness,
robustness, and scalability of the proposed algorithms. Fu-
ture work includes developing new vector-valued contractive
functions and generalizing the proposed methods to time-
evolving trust networks.
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Appendix
Proof of Theorem 4.2: For any r, s ∈ Rn and j, let
∆j = |(fmb(r))j − (fmb(s))j |
= |max{0, 1
2|Oj |
∑
i∈Oj
(Wji − ri)}−
max{0, 1
2|Oj |
∑
i∈Oj
(Wji − si)}|.
Consider the following four cases:
(A) 1
2|Oj |
∑
i∈Oj
(Wji − ri) ≤ 0 and
1
2|Oj |
∑
i∈Oj
(Wji − si) ≤ 0.
Obviously, ∆j = 0 ≤
1
2
||r− s||∞.
(B) 1
2|Oj |
∑
i∈Oj
(Wji − ri) ≥ 0 and
1
2|Oj |
∑
i∈Oj
(Wji − si) ≥ 0. We
have
∆j = |
1
2|Oj |
∑
i∈Oj
(si − ri)|
≤ 1
2|Oj |
∑
i∈Oj
|si − ri|
≤ 1
2|Oj |
∑
i∈Oj
||r− s||∞
= 1
2
||r − s||∞.
(C) 1
2|Oj |
∑
i∈Oj
(Wji − ri) ≥ 0 and
1
2|Oj |
∑
i∈Oj
(Wji − si) ≤ 0. By
1
2|Oj |
∑
i∈Oj
(Wji − si) ≤ 0, we have
∑
i∈Oj
Wji ≤
∑
i∈Oj
si. Then, we
have
∆j =
1
2|Oj |
∑
i∈Oj
(Wji − ri)
≤ 1
2|Oj |
∑
i∈Oj
(si − ri)
≤ 1
2|Oj |
∑
i∈Oj
|si − ri|
≤ 1
2
||r− s||∞.
(D) 1
2|Oj|
∑
i∈Oj
(Wji − ri) ≤ 0 and
1
2|Oj |
∑
i∈Oj
(Wji − si) ≥ 0.
Similar to the case (3), we have ∆j ≤
1
2
||r− s||∞.
To summarize, for any j, we have ∆j ≤
1
2
||r − s||∞. Hence,
fmb is a vector-valued contractive function with λ = 1/2. Since
0 ≤ Wji ≤ 1 and r ≤ e, thus 0 ≤ fmb ≤ e. This completes the
proof. ✷
Proof of Theorem 4.3: For any r, s ∈ Rn, we have
|(f1(r))j − (f1(s))j |
= | λ
|Oj|
∑
i∈Oj
|Wji − ri| −
λ
|Oj |
∑
i∈Oj
|Wji − si||
= λ
|Oj |
|
∑
i∈Oj
(|Wji − ri| − |Wji − si|)|
≤ λ
|Oj |
∑
i∈Oj
|ri − si|
≤ λ||r − s||∞
Since 0 ≤ r ≤ e, 0 ≤ Wji ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ λ < 1, thus 0 ≤ f1 ≤ e. ✷
Proof of Theorem 4.4: For any r, s ∈ Rn, let |Wju−ru|= max
i∈Oj
|Wji−
ri|, and |Wjv − sv|= max
i∈Oj
|Wji − si|, then we have
|(f2(r))j − (f2(s))j |
= |λmax
i∈Oj
|Wji − ri| − λmax
i∈Oj
|Wji − si||
≤ λmax{||Wju − ru| − |Wju − su||, ||Wjv − rv| − |Wjv − sv||}
≤ λmax{|ru − su|, |rv − sv|}
≤ λ||r − s||∞
Since 0 ≤ r ≤ e, 0 ≤ Wji ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ λ < 1, thus 0 ≤ f2 ≤ e. ✷
Proof of Theorem 4.5: For any r, s ∈ R, and r ≤ e, s ≤ e, we
have
|(f3(r))j − (f3(s))j |
= | λ
2|Oj |
∑
i∈Oj
(Wji − ri)2 −
λ
2|Oj |
∑
i∈Oj
(Wji − si)2|
≤ λ
2|Oj |
∑
i∈Oj
|(Wji − ri)
2 − (Wji − si)
2|
= λ
2|Oj |
∑
i∈Oj
|(si − ri)(2Wji − ri − si)|
≤ λ
|Oj|
∑
i∈Oj
|si − ri|
≤ λ||r − s||∞
Since 0 ≤ r ≤ e, 0 ≤ Wji ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ λ < 1, thus 0 ≤ f3 ≤ e. ✷
Proof of Theorem 4.6: For any r, s ∈ R, and r ≤ e, s ≤ e, let
(Wju − ru)2 = max
i∈Oj
(Wji − ri)2, and (Wjv − sv)2 = max
i∈Oj
(Wji −
si)
2, then we have
|(f4(r))j − (f4(s))j |
= |λ
2
max
i∈Oj
(Wji − ri)2 −
λ
2
max
i∈Oj
(Wji − si)2|
≤ λ
2
max{|(Wju − ru)2 − (Wju − su)2|,
|(Wjv − sv)
2 − (Wjv − rv)
2|}
= λ
2
max{|(su − ru)(2Wju − ru − su)|,
|(sv − rv)(2Wjv − rv − sv)|}
≤ λmax{|su − ru|, |sv − rv|}
≤ λ||r − s||∞
Since 0 ≤ r ≤ e, 0 ≤ Wji ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ λ < 1, thus 0 ≤ f4 ≤ e. ✷
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